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ERIE DOCTRINE, STATE LAW, AND CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION
Alexander A. Reinert*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine what the Erie doctrine would look like if the seminal case 1
involved the relevance of the Rules of Decision Act in a suit brought
against Erie County for federal civil rights violations with pendent state
law claims instead of a common law tort action brought against the Erie
Railroad Company. Perhaps the plaintiff claimed Erie County
intentionally hid evidence related to the plaintiff’s federal and related state
law claims. Should federal or state common law spoliation doctrine
govern the standard applied and available remedies? Or what if, after trial,
the plaintiff prevailed on both state and federal claims? If federal judgemade law permitted a multiplier of the lodestar for attorneys’ fees, but not
state law (or vice versa), the Court might have had to choose whose law
should apply when it was impossible to disentangle time spent on one set
of claims or another. If these were the disputes that characterized the first
Erie case, what would our choice of law framework look like when state
law questions arise in federal court?
Both cases and commentary suggest that the doctrine would look the
same. We know that Erie requires federal courts sitting in diversity
jurisdiction to apply state substantive law to resolve state law claims. 2 But
almost all scholars and jurists also maintain that Erie applies when federal

* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I am grateful for the thoughtful comments
of the participants in the University of Akron School of Law’s “Erie at Eighty: Choice of Law Across
the Disciplines,” including Craig Green, Michael Green, Laura Little, Michael Morley, and Ernest
Young.
1. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. Id. at 79–80.

SYMPOSIUM, ERIE AT EIGHTY: CHOICE OF LAW ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES

ERIE 04 REINERET MACRO 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

220

CONLAWNOW

5/29/2019 2:02 PM

[9:219

courts sit in federal question—or arising under—jurisdiction. 3 Erie itself
said that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State.” 4 Yet, for the most part, neither scholars nor federal judges have
taken the time to explain the precise role of Erie or the Rules of Decision
Act (RDA) in federal question cases. In other scholarship, I have argued
that Erie questions should be put in their jurisdictional context. 5 I
provided a framework for examining such questions that I referred to as
“Erie Step Zero.” In this essay, I expand on that framework by illustrating
how to consider the problem in cases involving civil rights litigation.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the issue is more than marginally
significant. One would not know it if one only read the Supreme Court
decisions—every Erie case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court has arisen
through diversity jurisdiction. 6 But lower courts have had to address the
problem in multiple contexts. First, and certainly most common, are those
cases in which state law claims are raised because they share a “common
nucleus of operative fact” 7 with a claim over which there is an
independent basis for arising under jurisdiction. 8 For the most part, courts
have assumed that Erie applies without any modification to these pendent
state law claims. 9 At the same time, when state law issues have arisen in
federal civil rights litigation—say application of privilege law—courts
have resisted applying state law if it interferes with federal interests.10
In my prior work, I proposed that, contrary to the conventional
wisdom, the Erie analysis should be placed in the jurisdictional context in
which the choice of law arises. For instance, in diversity cases, we
consider whether the choice between state and federal law is outcome

3. I review the literature in greater detail in other work. See Alexander A. Reinert, Erie Step
Zero, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2341, 2346–52 (2017). One notable exception will be discussed below.
See infra Part I.A. See generally Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the
Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1980) (arguing that the Erie doctrine should apply
differently in federal question and supplemental jurisdiction claims).
4. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
5. See Reinert, supra note 3, at 2372-76. Michael Green has argued along similar lines. See
Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1865 (2013).
6. To be clear, by “Erie case” I mean every case in which the Court relied upon the Erie
doctrine to resolve a choice-of-law question. In some federal question cases, the Court has explicitly
declined to apply the Erie analysis. See Reinert, supra note 3, aat 2356-58 & nn.
7. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012); Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715. These state law claims share a common
nucleus with a parallel federal law claim asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint or may enter a federal
question case as compulsory or permissive counterclaims raised by the defendant.
9. Reinert, supra note 3, at 2352–62.
10. Infra Part III.A.
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determinative in light of “the twin aims of the Erie rule.” 11 These twin
aims—avoiding forum shopping and inequitable administration of laws
based on the citizenship of the parties 12—have particular resonance in
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. But they do not necessarily translate
to cases in which jurisdiction is founded on a federal question. And as I
will discuss in detail later, they may be particularly inapt for claims
seeking remedies for federal civil rights violations. 13 On the other hand,
Hanna v. Plumer’s 14 insistence that we think of outcome
determinativeness from an ex ante rather than ex post perspective 15 is
sensible regardless of the jurisdictional context.
Taking these two insights together, therefore, I have proposed that
courts ask about forum shopping and inequity from an ex ante perspective
while recognizing that arising under jurisdiction serves different purposes
than diversity jurisdiction. Whereas diversity jurisdiction makes federal
courts available to resolve state law claims in a forum free from bias based
on state citizenship, arising under jurisdiction makes federal courts
available to resolve federal law issues. This is because federal judges
might be more experienced, solicitous, and knowledgeable about federal
law, and because it serves the federal system’s interest in uniformity. 16
When state law questions arise in federal question cases, they are almost
always intimately connected to the federal issues; perhaps they arise
through a state law claim that is part of the federal question claim’s
“common nucleus of operative fact,” 17 perhaps they arise through a state
law claim that contains an embedded and significant federal issue,18 or
perhaps it is necessary to resolve state law issues to resolve a federally
created legal claim. 19 In all of these cases, concerns about forum shopping
should be focused on those instances in which the choice of a federal

11. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468–69 (1965).
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 40-42.
14. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
15. See id. at 468–69.
16. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005)
(“The doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims
recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus
justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on
federal issues.”).
17. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
18. See, e.g., Grable, 545 U.S. at 313.
19. See State of Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (making an
independent determination of state law in a case founded on the Contract Clause, and not deferring
wholesale to the decision of the state’s highest court, “in order that the constitutional mandate may
not become a dead letter”).
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forum is motivated by something other than the recognized and beneficial
reasons for which we make federal courts available to resolve federal law.
Similarly, concerns about inequity should not be focused on citizenship
but on the differences in treatment between state law claimants who do or
do not have access to federal courts. Finally, to the extent Hanna
suggested that the balancing of interests introduced by Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Cooperative 20 was unnecessary or unimportant, examining Erie in the
context of federal question jurisdiction brings that balancing back to the
fore.
I take this analysis further in this essay because the interests at stake
in federal civil rights litigation sometimes call for skepticism towards state
law and an embrace of federal court jurisdiction. Indeed, there has long
been a link between substantive enforcement of federal civil rights and the
provision of federal jurisdiction to resolve such claims. Therefore, the
particular jurisdictional context of civil rights litigation may sometimes
call for even greater solicitude for federal law. 21
The value of this framework is not just that it helps to resolve
conflicts where application of state law interferes with federal claims (to
which courts have been sensitive). It also helps to frame how to address
circumstances where state law might be more open to federal civil rights
claims. Courts have neglected to view these circumstances through a
coherent lens.
The first part of this essay briefly reviews my prior proposal and then
explains its particular salience in civil rights litigation. I revisit my
framework that contextualizes the Erie analysis with respect to the
different goals of diversity and federal question jurisdiction. Critical to
this framework is recognizing that the first question in resolving a choiceof-law dispute between federal and state law is what I have called “Erie
Step Zero”—one must situate the dispute in its jurisdictional context
before moving to the more familiar Erie choice of law analysis. In part II,
I argue that the jurisdictional context of federal civil rights litigation
presents unique concerns when considering how to apply state law. Part
III then turns to specific examples of how conflicts between state and
federal law might be raised and resolved in federal civil rights litigation.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF JURISDICTIONAL CONTEXT TO ERIE QUESTIONS
In my prior work, I have engaged in a detailed survey of the scholarly
and judicial approach to Erie’s application outside of the diversity of
20.
21.

Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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citizenship context. In this essay, I will not belabor the point. In short,
courts and commentators almost uniformly assert that Erie questions are
the same whether they arise in diversity or arising under jurisdiction.22
The basis for this view is largely unexamined and, to the extent its
proponents cite to case law or other authority, unsupported. 23
Instead, once one closely examines Erie and its progeny, a basis for
a contrary account emerges: traditional Erie analysis, with its focus on
forum shopping concerns and unfairness based on state citizenship status,
is rooted in the diversity of citizenship context. This was not obvious from
the start—for although the Court has only considered Erie choice of law
questions in the context of diversity cases, when it began elaborating on
the Erie doctrine in cases like Guaranty Trust v. York 24 and Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Cooperative, 25 the Court did not explicitly tie its analysis of the
distinction between substance and procedure to the jurisdictional context
of diversity cases. But when the Supreme Court recalibrated the Erie
analysis in Hanna v. Plumer, 26 it did so with diversity jurisdiction in mind.
Hanna’s key insight, for the purpose of this essay, was that
determining the line between substance and procedure required in part a
determination of whether a rule was outcome-determinative in light of
Erie’s twin aims: reducing both forum shopping and inequitable outcomes
based on the citizenship of the parties. 27 The Court’s reasoning was
founded on the relationship between diversity jurisdiction and the Erie
doctrine. First, the Court emphasized that the pre-Erie doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson 28—in which federal courts were free to disregard state commonlaw decisions in diversity cases—had undermined the very purpose of
diversity jurisdiction, which was to level the playing field between
citizens and noncitizens of a state. 29 Because Swift made choice of law
turn on whether the case was brought in federal or state court, it gave the
out-of-state citizen-plaintiff the power to determine choice of law with the
initial filing decision. 30 Thus, Erie’s concern, highlighted by Hanna,
22. Reinert, supra note 3, at 2346–62.
23. Id. at 2362–67.
24. Guaranty Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
25. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
26. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
27. Id.
28. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
29. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467.
30. If the out-of-state plaintiff wished to take advantage of the state rule, she would file in state
court, preventing the in-state defendant from removing. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012) (prohibiting
removal on diversity grounds if the defendant is a citizen of the state in which suit was brought). If
the out-of-state plaintiff sought the benefit of the federal rule, she would file in federal court, where
the defendant could not shift the case to state court.
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about the inequitable administration of the laws was directly tied to the
mechanics of diversity jurisdiction. Erie’s concern about forum shopping,
also highlighted by Hanna, was less directly tied to diversity jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, Erie’s concern seemed to be that parties had manipulated
their own citizenship to create diversity jurisdiction so as to take
advantage of a particular rule that would be applied under the Swift
doctrine. 31 Nowhere did the Court in Hanna or Erie discuss concerns
about forum shopping in the context of federal question cases.
The concerns that animated Hanna do not transfer seamlessly to the
federal question context. The forum shopping that Hannah was concerned
about in diversity cases, for example, may not always be of concern in
federal question cases. After all, the purpose of Section 1331 jurisdiction
is to encourage forum shopping when the parties wish to resort to the
promise of experience, solicitude, and uniformity with respect to federal
law that are thought to be provided by federal courts. 32
The Hannah Court was understandably concerned about the potential
for the Erie doctrine to be used as a tool to foment inequality based on
state citizenship. After all, the purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to reduce
the potential for differential treatment based on state citizenship. It would
be a perverse outcome if Erie analysis undermined that goal. In the context
of federal question jurisdiction, however, that kind of bias is simply not at
issue, nor could Erie analysis exacerbate inequality along the axis of state
citizenship. 33
Placed in its jurisdictional context, therefore, Erie questions that
arise in federal question cases should be analyzed with different concerns
in mind. Rather than inequity based on citizenship, we should be focused
on potential inequity based on the happenstance that a litigant is able to
bring a state law claim into a federal forum simply because it overlaps
with the factual and legal contours of a federal question claim or simply
because it implicates the need to resolve a substantial federal issue.34 We
also would want to avoid adjudicating state law claims differently simply
because a litigant has chosen to frame them as supplemental claims to a
federal question anchor if the litigant also could have brought them
independently as diversity claims. 35

31. Erie R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938) (discussing Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)); see also Hanna, 380
U.S. at 467 n.8 (citing Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 518).
32. Reinert, supra note 3, at 2372.
33. Id. at 2372–73.
34. Id. at 2373.
35. Id. at 2373–74.
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As to forum shopping, we should be on the lookout for cases in which
parties choose federal court for reasons other than those recognized as
valid for the purposes of arising under and supplemental jurisdiction. The
motivation for bringing pendent state law claims in federal court may have
nothing to do with forum shopping but instead may relate to efficiency
goals or rules of preclusion, which create an incentive to bring the claims
together in the same jurisdiction. 36 Indeed, if the federal question claim is
the moving force in the litigation, the litigant who invokes supplemental
jurisdiction may fundamentally be motivated by the desire to “resort to
the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum
offers on federal issues.” 37 This choice is one to be supported, not one that
should arouse suspicion. And to the extent that forum shopping might be
present, it would likely be filtered out by a district court’s application of
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), which authorizes a district court to decline the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when the pendent claim
substantially predominates over the federal question claim.
After one has conducted this outcome-determinative test, modified
for federal question jurisdiction, there still is the potential that Byrd
balancing should play a role. 38 To be sure, if a court decides that the choice
between federal and state law is not outcome determinative, then it will
be free to apply the federal rule. If a court decides that the choice is
outcome determinative, however, it should move to Byrd balancing to
determine whether federal interests are sufficiently important to outweigh
the state interest in applying its rule. For if one is concerned that Hanna’s
analysis gives short shrift to federal interests in diversity cases, 39 one
should presumably be at least as concerned when we move to the federal
question context.
III. ERIE STEP ZERO AND CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURT
Applying this framework in the context of federal civil rights
litigation has additional implications. First, if jurisdictional context
matters for resolving Erie questions, then civil rights litigation is a special
brand of arising under jurisdiction. When the Reconstruction-era Civil
Rights laws were passed—creating substantive rights to enforce federal
36. Id. at 2374.
37. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
38. Reinert, supra note 3, at 2374–75.
39. Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the
Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 360 (1977) (criticizing Hanna precisely because it
shifted focus from the balance between federal and state interests prioritized in Byrd to avoidance of
forum shopping and litigant inequity).
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constitutional norms against state actors—they included a specific
jurisdictional provision (now 28 U.S.C. § 1343), that gave federal courts
jurisdiction over such actions. At the time, the general federal question
jurisdiction statute (the precursor to 28 U.S.C. § 1331), included an
amount-in-controversy requirement, which stayed in place until 1980. 40
But the provision granting jurisdiction over civil rights actions never
contained an amount-in-controversy requirement. Congress believed that
the rights protected by the 1871 Civil Rights Act were important enough
that federal jurisdiction over them should not depend on the valuation of
particular constitutional rights. 41 As the Supreme Court viewed it, the
substantive rights created by the 1871 Act would have been meaningless
without the jurisdictional grant. 42 Thus, it is not just that federal arising
under jurisdiction offers a venue in which federal law would be received
without hostility—federal court jurisdiction was viewed as essential to
full enforcement of civil rights.
There is a second aspect of federal civil rights litigation related to the
jurisdictional grant that also gives a different timbre to Erie questions that
may arise in civil rights litigation in federal courts. Civil rights litigation
in federal court, particularly litigation embraced by Section 1343’s
jurisdictional grant, is often brought against state actors of some kind. The
Reconstruction Congress was understandably skeptical of the willingness
or ability of state courts to entertain such suits in an unbiased way. This is
reflected in the jurisdictional statute discussed above and also in the
substantive treatment of, for example, Section 1983 claims. As just one
example, in Monroe v. Pape the Court made clear that federal civil rights
claims are actionable without regard to whether remedies exist under state
law—a person acts under color of state law whether or not her conduct is
authorized or lawful under state law. 43 Holding to the contrary, the Court
concluded, would leave the enforcement of substantive federal rights

40. See Pub. L. 96-486 (eliminating $10,000 amount in controversy requirement for general
federal question jurisdiction). The amount in controversy requirement had been eliminated in part in
1976, when it was removed for claims against the United States and federal officials sued in their
official capacity. See Pub. L. 94-574.
41. The interrelationship of general federal question jurisdiction and Section 1343 was
discussed at length in Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 529 (1939).
42. See Hague, 307 U.S. at 529 (“We can hardly suppose that Congress, having in the broad
terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 vested in all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
a right of action in equity for the deprivation of constitutional immunities, cognizable only in the
federal courts, intended by the Act of 1875 to destroy those rights of action by withholding from the
courts of the United States jurisdiction to entertain them.”).
43. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
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subject to the vagaries of state law, a result that was in tension with the
overriding purpose of the 1871 Civil Rights Act and its brethren. 44
How does this translate to the application of Erie in civil rights
litigation in federal court? Diversity jurisdiction is founded on the need
to avoid bias of state courts based on citizenship. Federal civil rights
jurisdiction is founded on the need to avoid state court bias in favor of
state institutions and actors. When Erie questions arise in these distinct
contexts, Erie analysis should be tailored to the goals to be achieved by
the distinct jurisdictional grants. In diversity cases, Erie analysis should
be concerned with bias based on citizenship—in particular bias against instate residents in favor of out-of-state residents—while in federal civil
rights litigation one should apply Erie conscious of avoiding bias in favor
of state institutions.
Under this rubric, application of state law should be disfavored in
federal civil rights litigation if it interferes with enforcement of
substantive federal civil rights claims. In many respects, the law already
takes account of this in situations in which federal claims are directly
implicated—when federal courts borrow from state law to fill in gaps that
laws like Section 1983 leave open. 45 But courts are less attuned to this
when asked to apply state law to pendent state claims, even when the
application of state law could have an impact on enforcement of the
federal claim.
Moreover, in some areas of law, courts have neglected at all to
consider what should happen when state institutions make themselves
more amenable to suit than federal law provides. Courts have not seen this
as a choice of law problem, but there are reasons to reconsider that
assumption. I explore the ramifications here for the doctrine of qualified
immunity.
I concede that as a bottom-line matter, this analysis may result in
courts declaring that some rules are substantive for diversity purposes but
not for federal question purposes, which will be troubling to some. Some
scholars already recoil against the related idea of having dual readings of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure depending on whether the basis for
jurisdiction is diversity or federal question. 46 But the Supreme Court has
acknowledged at times that the line between substance and procedure

44. Id. at 180.
45. Federal courts borrow state law under 42 U.S.C. (1988) to fill in gaps in federal law when
adjudicating federal claims, but not if state law is hostile to federal interests.
46. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH.
U. L. REV. 103, 125 (2011).
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might differ depending on whether jurisdiction is based on diversity or the
presence of a federal question. 47
Lower courts have implied the same at times, 48 but there is little
consistency in how courts have addressed the question. Many courts,
applying the intuition that Erie applies regardless of the basis for
jurisdiction, have concluded that state law controls both the federal and
supplemental state law claims even if they would have disregarded state
law were the federal claim brought on its own. 49 And some, while
acknowledging the force of the argument that there is a difference between
the jurisdictional contexts, ask if providing a different approach for such
questions is justifiable as a practical matter. 50 But the lower courts have

47. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 652 (1953). In Levinson, the Court held that federal
practice regarding amendments to pleadings applied to an admiralty case but recognized that the issue
might be analyzed differently were jurisdiction founded on diversity. (“Whether, if this were a
diversity case, we would consider that we are here dealing with ‘forms and modes’ or with matters
more seriously affecting the enforcement of the right, it is clear that we are not dealing with an integral
part of the right created by Kentucky.”). Id.
48. For example, when lower courts heard Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) cases
under diversity jurisdiction, as they had assumed that the TCPA did not create a federal cause of
action, they applied Erie to choice of law disputes. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335,
342 (2d Cir. 2006); Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 485 F.Supp.2d 179, 183–84 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 618
F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds; Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). After the Supreme Court clarified that the TCPA does create
federal question jurisdiction, see Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368 (2012), however,
lower courts felt free to disregard Erie, see, e.g., Bailey v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 867 F.Supp.2d 835,
839–40 (E.D. La. 2012). Even outside of the TCPA context, courts have recognized the possibility
that a state law could be substantive for diversity but not federal question contexts. See, e.g., Doe v.
City of Chicago, 883 F.Supp. 1126, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (discussing the role of a state law affidavit
of merit requirement).
49. Bradley v. City of Ferndale, 148 F. App’x 499, 511 (6th Cir. 2005) (looking to state law to
determine if denial of immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal where a state law claim is
supplemental to a § 1983 claim); Aliotta v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 315 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir.
2003) (applying state law to a jury instructions issue involving a state law claim in which there was
federal question jurisdiction); In re Larry’s Apartment, L.L.C., 249 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“[A] federal court sitting in diversity applies state law in deciding whether to allow attorney’s fees
when those fees are connected to the substance of the case.”); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
67 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying state law to determine the fee award where a plaintiff
in a civil rights case prevailed on federal and state causes of action); Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp.,
Nos. C 04-0098 SI, C 04-0099 SI, 2008 WL 2340211, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2008) (“If the jury had
based its verdicts solely on Title VII, federal law would govern the award of fees. Because the jury
verdicts were based on both federal and state law claims, however, the Erie doctrine dictates that state
law governs the issuance of attorney fees.”); Chin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 461 F.Supp.2d 279, 283
(D.N.J. 2006) (applying state law regarding attorney’s fees in a case in which state law claims were
supplemental to claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act).
50. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in Federal
Courts, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 at 658 n.286 (2013) (acknowledging possible difference in
interpretive approaches but inviting analysis of whether “such confusing differences are necessary in
practice”).
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been forced to address this question without sufficient guidance from the
Supreme Court or commentators.
IV. EXAMPLES OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
LAW IN CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
A.

Erie Step Zero and Privilege Law

One of the most common areas in which a conflict between state and
federal law has arisen in federal question cases with supplemental state
law claims is privilege law. 51 Indeed, in the debate regarding the adoption
of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the Senate Judiciary Committee was
concerned about how Rule 501 would be applied in federal question cases
with pendent state law claims. 52 But Rule 501 did not resolve the problem,
stating unhelpfully that where state law “supplies the rules of decision,”
privilege claims should be governed by state law. 53 The intent was to
incorporate Erie analysis into Rule 501 because there were some
questions about whether state law as to privileges would be considered
substantive under Hanna. 54 This works fine in a diversity case but not in
a federal question case with pendent state law claims because states
recognize privileges from disclosure that could limit both the information
disclosed during pretrial discovery and the evidence presented at trial. 55 If
state law privileges were applied during pretrial discovery to bar access to
information relevant to a federal question claim, it could substantially
interfere with enforcement of a federal right. If it were enforced during
trial, such that relevant statements were not admissible at all, even on
federal law claims, or certain statements were admissible on certain

51. Martin I. Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Civil Litigation, 43 FORDHAM
L. REV. 923 at 948 (1975) (recognizing that the question of privileges becomes more difficult when
there are supplemental state law claims in a federal question case).
52. Id. at 958–60 (detailing rulemakers’ concern that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 might
apply differently depending on the jurisdictional basis of the claim).
53. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices &
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2011 WL 1375011, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011)
(MDL action).
54. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 9 (1973) (stating that privilege rules should be considered
substantive for Erie purposes); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 379 n.6 (3d Cir.
1990); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 438, 446 (D. Nev. 1987); Theodore Campagnolo, The
Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and Federal Criminal Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues,
38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 500 (2002); Harold L. Korn, Professor, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Remarks on the
Continuing Effect of State Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts (June 21, 1969), in A Discussion
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence Before the Annual Judicial Conference Second Judicial
Circuit of the United States, 48 F.R.D. 39, 75 (1969)
55. Rule 501 applies to all stages of a civil proceeding, not just at trial. See FED. R. EVID.
1101(c).
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claims but not others, it would either directly or indirectly interfere with
distinct federal interests.
Using the framework proposed here, however, would clarify how
courts should resolve these issues. For example, if the state law privilege
barred access to evidence or discovery that was relevant only to the state
law claim, it could be enforced in full—in this circumstance, there would
be no conflict between applying state and federal privilege law. To the
extent that there is a conflict, however, one could rely on the modified
Erie analysis to resolve it. Do we expect, ex ante, that a federal forum was
chosen so as to take advantage of the federal privilege laws in the
adjudication of the state law claim? Is there a concern about inequity in
the application of state privilege law because of the happenstance that in
this case the state law claims share common facts with a federal question
claim? Is the state privilege law one that protects governmental
institutions and state actors from accountability for unlawful conduct?
Even if the answers to these questions suggest that the choice of law is
outcome determinative, how should the federal interests be balanced
against those of the state?
If the claim sounds in civil rights, there may be even stronger
arguments for applying federal law where evidence or discovery is
relevant to all claims. The jurisdictional grant in civil rights claims is
deeply connected to substantive rights enforcement. And it would
undermine federal interests if the presence of a supplemental state law
claim made it harder to enforce federal civil rights. If enforcement of the
state law privilege law will have an impact throughout the entire case, it
is more likely that a court should choose to enforce federal common law.
As it turns out, most courts have come to a similar conclusion. Some
courts have held that federal law applies across the board to both federal
claims and pendent state law claims. 56 Others have held that the federal
law of privilege governs where the evidence sought is relevant to both
federal and state law claims, an outcome more consistent with my
proposed framework. 57

56. See Tucker v. United States, 143 F.Supp.2d 619, 622–25 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (applying
federal privilege law to a Federal Tort Claims Act claim and to a pendent state law claim, based both
on interpretation of Rule 501 and principles of uniformity); In re Combustion, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 51,
53–54 (W.D. La.), aff’d, 161 F.R.D. 54 (W.D. La. 1995) (finding that federal law applied across the
board in part because the relevant federal statutes both provided for exclusive jurisdiction).
57. See Reinert, supra note 3, at 2360 n.108.

ERIE 04 REINERET MACRO 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

B.

ERIE AND FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION

5/29/2019 2:02 PM

231

Erie Step Zero and Cost-Shifting

Several courts have held, in the supplemental jurisdiction context,
that the Erie doctrine requires that state law govern awards of attorney’s
fees in cases where a judgment is based on both federal and state claims. 58
The framework I propose here would raise questions about this approach.
For it is well recognized that, in areas such as Title VII and Section 1983,
for instance, fee- and cost-shifting provisions are part and parcel of
effective enforcement of the statutory regime. 59 Thus, if applying state
fee-shifting rules to federal law claims undermines those substantive
goals, it may be inappropriate to do so. It may be that in cases that have
common facts, costs and fees attributable to a state law claim are
indistinguishable from those attributable to a federal law claim. But if that
is the case, one still needs a valid reason to choose state law over federal
law to govern cost shifting.
Some examples may be of assistance. In an age discrimination case,
a jury awards damages based on both federal and state law. Federal law
prohibits a multiplier for attorneys’ fees under certain circumstances, but
state law permits it. May the court apply a multiplier to the lodestar for all
claims or only the state law claim? 60 One court that analyzed the question
used traditional Erie analysis and applied state law to calculate attorneys’
fees because applying state law in state court but not in federal court
would lead to forum shopping and inequity. 61 In other words, the state
method for calculating attorneys’ fees was substantive and due to be
enforced through the RDA. The court did not address whether this holding
applied only to state law claims.
But the matter is not so simple—if it is impossible to distinguish
between time spent on a federal claim and a state claim (and often it will
be), applying state law might have the impact of providing greater
recovery for attorneys’ fees than is permitted under federal law. The
framework I propose would ask courts to consider whether doing so

58.
59.

See id. at 2376 n.211.
See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 4, 62 (2010); Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV.
782, 793–94 (2011); cf. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55–56 (1991) (concluding that the
district court acted within its discretion in a diversity case by invoking its inherent power and
assessing attorney’s fees and expenses as a sanction for a party’s bad faith litigation conduct, and
rejecting an Erie challenge to the district court’s action).
60. This hypothetical is based on Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478
(9th Cir. 1995) (applying state law to determine the fee award where a plaintiff in a civil rights case
prevailed on federal and state causes of action).
61. Id. at 1479.
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would undermine federal interests. In this case, it is hard to construct an
argument that applying state law would ultimately undermine federal law.
But if we take the basic holding and treat it as creating a rule that
entitlement to attorneys’ fees is substantive, how should one address a
different problem? Under federal law, statutory attorneys’ fees belong to
the client. Under state law, statutory attorneys’ fees belong to the attorney,
and the attorney therefore has standing to seek fees even where the client
disclaims any such intention. In a federal civil rights case with pendent
state law claims, does the attorney have standing to seek statutory fees as
a prevailing party? 62 If the right to seek attorneys’ fees is substantive, can
it be argued that the question of who may assert that right is clearly
procedural? And again, if time spent on state and federal claims is
indistinguishable, may a lawyer use federal courts to obtain attorneys
fees’ simply because she can append a state law claim to it that carries
with it a substantive right for attorney enforcement? 63
C.

Erie Step Zero and Spoliation

Federal and state law differ as to what standard to use for prelitigation spoliation of evidence and what remedy may be obtained. In a
case in which there are federal law claims and pendent state law claims,
part of a common nucleus of operative fact, what standard may be applied
to pre-litigation spoliation of evidence? 64 Under traditional Erie analysis,
where the case arises in a diversity context, state substantive law on
spoliation will be applied. 65
But in the context of federal civil rights litigation, should the same
result obtain? If the spoliation has an impact on both the federal and state
claims, does the federal court violate the RDA by imposing federal
spoliation law? Does it undermine federal interests by applying state
spoliation law?
In application, much likely depends on which spoliation law can be
considered to impose stricter obligations. If state law is more onerous than
federal law, it advances state substantive policy by applying state law and
62. This hypothetical is based on Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., Nos. C 04-0098 SI, C 040099 SI, 2008 WL 2340211, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2008) (“If the jury had based its verdicts solely
on Title VII, federal law would govern the award of fees. Because the jury verdicts were based on
both federal and state law claims, however, the Erie doctrine dictates that state law governs the
issuance of attorney fees.”)
63. As one court saw it, much depended on whether the plaintiff prevailed on state law claims
or “solely on federal claims.” Alvarado, 2008 WL 2340211, at *4.
64. ArcelorMittal Indiana Harbor LLC v. Amex Nooter, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-195-PRC, 2018
WL 509890, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 23, 2018)
65. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 53–54 (1991).

ERIE 04 REINERET MACRO 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

ERIE AND FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION

5/29/2019 2:02 PM

233

does not undermine any articulable federal interests. Nor is it in tension
with any of the reasons that jurisdiction is exercised in federal court.
Different state law might create disuniformity in federal court, but we can
tolerate this result without undermining other important federal interests.
If federal law imposes stricter obligations, does it undermine state
substantive law to apply federal law in the context of connected state and
federal law claims? We might answer this question yes only if the state
law claims are the driving force behind the litigation, itself an independent
reason to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. In the absence of
that condition being present, failing to apply federal law would undermine
important federal interests connected to vindicating federal civil rights. In
a jurisdictional context, the Erie analysis is more complex than the
straightforward diversity-based inquiry.
D.

Erie Step Zero and Anti-SLAPP Laws

At least thirty-two states have passed so-called Anti-SLAPP
legislation, purporting to target “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation,” also known as SLAPP suits. 66 Anti-SLAPP measures as a
general matter seek to protect individuals who exercise their right to
petition the government to address pressing social problems, but in some
states they have been enacted to provide even broader protections.67 In the
Erie context, anti-SLAPP statutes can be troublesome because they can
affect only specific claims within a case as well as the trajectory of an
entire case. Texas’s law, for example, permits (1) dismissal of an entire
complaint if the Court finds that it has been filed in violation of the antiSLAPP law, (2) fee shifting for successful motions to dismiss, (3) a stay
of all discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss or any appeal,
and (4) interlocutory appeals of denials of motions to dismiss. 68 Thus,
even if only one claim of many is alleged to have violated the anti-SLAPP
statute, the remedies provided under Texas’s law can affect an entire case.
In the traditional Erie diversity context, many courts would find that
Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute is substantive and applicable in federal

66. State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.antislapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection (listing state anti-SLAPP laws) [https://perma.cc/2DN5DKFK]
67. For a criticism of the reach of current anti-SLAPP laws, see Alexander A. Reinert, SPEAK
FREE Act Would Silence Civil Rights and Public Interest Litigants (Editorial), THE HILL (July 7,
2016).
68. Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem § 27.003(c) (providing for stay of discovery on filing of motion to
dismiss); id. § 27.008 (providing for interlocutory appeal); Id. § 27.009 (providing for award of
attorneys’ fees).
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court. 69 And some have applied anti-SLAPP laws to state law claims made
in the context of a federal question lawsuit.70 But courts have been hesitant
to apply anti-SLAPP laws to federal question claims. 71 In one intellectual
property case, for example, a court explicitly held that anti-SLAPP laws
applied to the defendant’s state-law counterclaims, but not to the
plaintiff’s federally-created patent infringement action. 72 The defendant
had argued that the anti-SLAPP law should apply to all claims but the
court rejected that contention without any analysis. 73
It should be obvious, however, that even if limited to state law claims
in federal civil rights litigation, anti-SLAPP laws could undermine
important federal interests. Staying all discovery and permitting
interlocutory appeals, even if the ultimate remedy of dismissal and fee
shifting is limited to state law claims, will interfere with the enforcement
of federal rights in federal courts. It thus may make sense to disaggregate
elements of an anti-SLAPP law before determining how it should apply
in the context of a federal civil rights litigation.

69. United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 171 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding statute was applicable to state law counterclaims asserted in a federal diversity action);
Mitchell v. Hood, 614 F. App’x 137, 140 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing disagreement among courts of
appeals as to whether state anti-SLAPP laws apply in federal court); Henry v. Lake Charles Am.
Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Louisiana law, including the nominallyprocedural Article 971 (Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP provision), governs this diversity case.”); Williams
v. Cordillera Commc’ns, Inc., 2014 WL 2611746, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2014) (explaining that
state anti-SLAPP statutes “are enforceable in federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction” by virtue
of the Erie doctrine).
70. United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.3d 963, 970
(9th Cir.1999), and Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 460 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2006), held the
anti-SLAPP statute applicable to state-law counterclaims in federal courts.
71. Best v. Hendrickson Appraisal Co., Inc., No. 06-CV-1358 W (JMA), 2007 WL 1110632,
at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2007) (“Erie applies in federal court, even on some federal claims (contra
Best), but the court must analyze more than the “twin aims of Erie “ before it chooses to apply state
law (contra Hendrickson).”); See NCDR LLC v. Mauze & Bagby, PLLC, 2012 WL 12871954, at *2
(S.D. Tex. October 5, 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 745 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the
TCPA does not apply to plaintiff’s federal Lanham Act claims because it would create an obstacle to
the federal rights in violation of the Supremacy Clause); See also Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d
894, 901 (9th Cir. 2010) (refusing to apply anti-SLAPP statute to a Section 43(a) Lanham Act claim
on the ground that “the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to federal law causes of action”); Tobinick
v. Novella, 108 F.Supp.3d 1299, 1302 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (holding state anti-SLAPP statute does not
apply to Lanham Act claim); Doctor’s Data, Inc. v. Barrett, 2011 WL 5903508, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
22, 2011) (refusing to apply Illinois anti-SLAPP rules to Lanham Act claim); Misko v. Backes, No.
3:16-CV-3080-M (BT), 2018 WL 2335466, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 4, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-CV-3080-M (BT), 2018 WL 2329306 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2018)
(refusing to apply anti-SLAPP statute to federal question claim).
72. Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1129–30 (N.D.
Cal. 1999)
73. Id.
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State Immunity Doctrine in Federal Civil Rights Litigation

Finally, although courts have rarely seen this issue as a choice of law
problem, the role of state immunity law in federal civil rights litigation
merits further inquiry. It would appear to be obvious that whether an
individual is immune from damages liability is substantive in the
traditional procedural/substantive distinction. And under traditional Erie
analysis, one would expect state immunity law to apply to state law claims
raised in diversity cases.
But how should the matter be analyzed in federal civil rights
litigation? There are three different contexts in which to consider the
question. First, although the immunity defense itself may be substantive,
it might be more difficult to characterize common-law doctrines that
operate at the margins of immunity doctrine. Take, for example, the issue
of whether immunity determinations are reviewable interlocutorily.
Federal law says that they are in certain situations, but state law sometimes
diverges. 74 In Bradley, the Court applied state law regarding interlocutory
appeals to adjudicate a state law claim that was brought as a supplemental
claim in a Section 1983 action. 75 If state law granted broader rights of
interlocutory appeal than federal law, however, 76 this may be a
circumstance where application of state law meant to favor state
institutions would be inappropriate where the jurisdictional grant is based
on a federal civil rights statute.
Difficult questions could also arise where the substance of immunity
law differs at state and federal law. If state law, for example, provides
broader immunity to state officers than does federal law, it would be
inconsistent with the principles I have elaborated upon here to apply state
immunity law to the federal civil rights claim. And even as to which
immunity law governs the state law claim, difficult questions could
arise. 77 In Kohlrautz, the Court conducted a nuanced Erie analysis, taking
into account jurisdictional context to determine that state (rather than
federal) immunity law should apply to state law claims brought via
supplemental jurisdiction in a federal question case.
Finally, the framework I have outlined here may also have
implications for the rare case in which state immunity law exposes state
officers to greater liability under state law than would federal immunity
74. See, e.g., Bradley v. City of Ferndale, 148 F. App’x 499, 511 (6th Cir. 2005).
75. Id.
76. Say, for example, that state law permitted appeal of denials of immunity at summary
judgment when the issue turned on questions of fact, even though such appeals would not be
cognizable under federal common law. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 , 313-17(1995).
77. Kohlrautz v. Oilmen Participation Corp., 441 F.3d 827, 830–33 (9th Cir. 2006).
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principles. Courts have not generally seen this as a choice of law problem
raised by the RDA, but courts should. Maryland, for example, does not
permit state officials to assert any immunity from liability for violations
of the state constitution. 78 If the defendant is shown to have acted
intentionally, as opposed to negligently, she also will not be entitled to
immunity from common law torts. 79 In Maryland, therefore, one could
argue that federal courts should respect these substantive judgments in
application of the Section 1983 doctrine. It would not interfere with any
federal interests to do so, and it would advance state substantive
judgments. Additionally, to the extent that federal courts are available in
civil rights actions in order to avoid the risk of bias in favor of state
institutions and state actors, applying state privilege law that is more
rights-protective than federal law would not trigger any concerns of bias
in favor of states and the state’s entities or actors.
V. CONCLUSION
Erie’s takeaway is that much turns on whether a state law is deemed
substantive or procedural. But this assessment cannot be undertaken
without being conscious of the jurisdictional context in which any conflict
arises. As I have argued elsewhere, diversity cases present a different
context than federal questions cases. As I argue here, civil rights cases
present a different context as well. In some circumstances, as in diversity
cases, it will make sense to apply state law through and through to state
law claims presented in federal question or federal civil rights cases. In
other contexts, federal law should govern the entire matter. Finally, there
may be some contexts in which state law should apply to federal civil
rights cases because it is more rights-protective than federal judge-made
common law.

78. DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 371 (Md. 1999) (“Unlike in a § 1983 action and unlike in
an action for some common law torts, neither the local government official nor a local governmental
entity has available any governmental immunity in an action based on rights protected by the State
Constitution.”).
79. Cox v. Prince George’s County, 460 A.2d 1038 (Md. 1983).

